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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.  At the heart of international 
law is the balance between a state’s right to extract resources within 
its sovereign boundaries and its obligation to prevent harm to 
other states.1  Recent research suggests that offshore hydrocarbon 
extraction within a sovereign state’s exclusive economic zone can 
cause transboundary pollution.2  The Arctic Circle is estimated to 
contain over 90 billion barrels of oil, 17 trillion cubic feet of 
undiscovered gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, 
comprising significant portions of the world’s undiscovered 
hydrocarbon resources.3  Roughly 84% of undiscovered Arctic 
resources are expected to be found offshore.4  In 2018, the United 
States Congress has opened parts of the Arctic to oil and gas 
drilling and repealed the offshore drilling safety regulations that 
were put in place after the Deepwater Horizon spill.5  Other 
 
1.  MARTE JERVAN, THE PROHIBITION OF TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL HARM. AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NO-HARM RULE (Aug. 25, 2014).  
2.  Kim Martineau, As Climate Stirs Arctic Sea Ice Faster, Pollution Tags Along - 
Contaminants More Likely to Cross National Borders, Study Shows, EARTH INST. BLOGS (June 27, 
2017), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2017/06/27/as-climate-stirs-arctic-sea-ice-faster-poll 
ution-tags-along/ [https://perma.cc/F69W-CHR5].  
3.  See D. L. GAUTIER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS FACT SHEET 2008-3049, 
CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF 
THE ARCTIC CIRCLE (2008); see also M. E. BROWNFIELD ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS 
FACT SHEET 2012–3042, AN ESTIMATE OF UNDISCOVERED CONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS 
RESOURCES OF THE WORLD (2012). 
4.  GAUTIER, supra note 3, at 3. 
5.  Lisa Friedman, Trump Moves to Open Nearly All Offshore Waters to Drilling, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/climate/trump-offshore-drilling.html 
[https://perma.cc/M8YS-S97C]; Lisa Friedman & Hiroko Tabuchi, U.S. to Roll Back Safety 
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countries, including Norway and Russia, have similarly encouraged 
arctic oil exploration.6  Yet, existing equipment is simply 
inadequate to deal with pollution accidents that will inevitably 
occur as such explorations continue.7 
Despite the potential increases in drilling in the coming years, 
the Arctic does not have a coherent and effective legal regime to 
handle the threat posed by oil pollution.8  It is therefore necessary 
and timely to assess the effectiveness of international 
environmental law in protecting Arctic biodiversity against oil 
pollution.  This Note assesses the effectiveness of the current 
environmental regime in the Arctic along three axes: participation 
& liability, scientific, and cooperative.  This Note argues that, 
despite their failure to meet participatory and liability standards, 
existing laws may be effective in protecting Arctic biodiversity 
against oil pollution if new implementation agreements are 
adopted.  Adequate protection for Arctic biodiversity also depends 
on better operational practices and compliance with existing 
regulations.9  As such, this Note recommends ways to improve the 
efficacy of arctic agreements. 
Part II provides background on the Arctic environment, the 
possible impacts of oil pollution, and the current legal authority 
governing resource exploitation in the Arctic.  Part III introduces 
and applies a theoretical framework for assessing efficacy of 
existing authorities by focusing on whether they modify state 
actors’ utilities, whether they facilitate learning, and whether they 
 
Rules Created After Deepwater Horizon Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/12/28/us/trump-offshore-drilling.html?module=inline.  
6.  See Richard Milne, Norway opens up record 93 blocks for Arctic oil exploration, FIN. TIMES 
(Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a120d578-567e-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f  
[https://perma.cc/Z7MA-8NXF] (Norway has opened over ninety blocks in the Arctic for oil 
exploration); see also Tsvetana Paraskova, Russia Goes All in on Arctic Oil Development, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/energy/2017/10/24/ 
russia-goes-all-arctic-oil-development/792990001/ [https://perma.cc/6MS6-KVCF] (Russia’s 
state-controlled oil entities have already started in the Russian Arctic shelf.  Russia has also 
publicly stated that Arctic oil and Arctic development are a national priority.). 
7.  Lars-Otto Reiersen et al., The Arctic—A Sentinel for Environmental Processes and Effects, in 
ARCTIC SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CLIMATE CHANGE 15, 31 (Susanne Wasum-Rainer 
et al. eds., 2011). 
8.  LILLY WEIDEMANN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ARCTIC MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT 115 (Hamburg Studies of Maritime Affairs, Volume 27, 2014) (“[R]egulation 
of this sector is patchy.  None of the international conventions on protection of the marine 
environment is solely concerned with the regulation of offshore oil and gas development.”).  
9.  Reiersen et al., supra note 7, at 31. 
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facilitate coordination.  Part IV recommends possible ways to 
improve the efficacy of the Arctic regime including an umbrella 
Transboundary Marine Pollution Treaty, an Arctic Insurance 
Agreement, and standardized Marine Protected Areas.  Finally, Part 
V summarizes the importance of U.S. leadership in proposed 
solutions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Arctic Geography 
The legal, geographic boundaries of the Arctic are complex.  
There are eight Arctic States that have an interest in the Arctic 
Ocean: the United States, Russia, Canada, Greenland (Denmark), 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland.10  Under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNLCOS”), each of 
these nations have control over an exclusive economic zone 
(“EEZ”) that extends 200 nautical miles (“NM”) off its shoreline.11 
 
10.  Member States, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2015), https://arctic-council.org/ 
index.php/en/about-us/member-states [https://perma.cc/5PZ5-6CZC]. 
11.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
KANNAN FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2020  6:29 PM 
2020] Transboundary Pollution from Arctic Oil Drilling 245 
Figure 1: Map of maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic 
region and accompanying notes (Source: IBRU: Centre for Borders 
Research, Durham University) 
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Parties to UNCLOS may also petition under Article 76(4)–(7) for 
sovereign rights beyond the 200 NM.12  These petitions are directed 
to the Convention’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (“CLCS”).13  Many coastal Arctic States including Russia, 
Norway, and Iceland have done so.14  Because it is not a party to 
UNCLOS, the United States cannot make such a petition.15  The 
establishment of these extensions can prove invaluable given the 
vast petroleum resources expected to be found there.16  Beyond the 
extended EEZs lie parts of the marine Arctic that are beyond 
national jurisdiction (“ABNJ”) and are controlled under the High 
Seas provisions of UNCLOS.17 
B. The Arctic Environment 
The Arctic is one of the few pristine habitats remaining on this 
planet.  It has diverse ecosystems—from sea ice to wetlands, 
mountains to the Arctic Ocean and the surrounding seas.  
Although the Arctic has such extensive landscapes, this Note will 
focus principally on ice sheets and maritime areas, as they are 
susceptible to oil pollution impacts and remediation efforts.  The 
Arctic marine environment is home to a rich array of animal 
diversity including polar bears, salmon, seals, narwhals, and 
beluga whales.18  Many of these species are endangered, 
including bowhead whales, polar bears, and ringed seals.19  These 
animals rely on 25 million square kilometers of sea ice for 
 
12.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 76. 
13.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at Annex II, art. 3 
14.  Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 15, 2019), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X22G-YQEM]. 
15.  Marta Kolcz-Ryan, An Arctic Race: How the United States’ Failure to Ratify the Law of the Sea 
Convention could Adversely Affect its Interests in the Arctic, 35 DAYTON L.R. 149–173 (2009). 
16.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 78. 
17.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 87. 
18.  See Arctic Facts, WORLD WILDLIFE FED’N, https://www.worldwildlife.org/places/arctic 
[https://perma.cc/CRD7-F447] (last accessed Sept. 09, 2019); Arctic, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Arctic  [https://perma.cc/FG2G-8JRL] 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
19.  Christina Nunez, What Happens When Oil Spills in the Arctic?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 
24, 2014), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/04/140423-national-
research-council-on-oil-spills-in-arctic/ [https://perma.cc/CK2M-QJPV]. 
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foraging, hunting, and birthing.20  Studies show that the 
thickness and extent of summer sea ice in the Arctic have 
declined dramatically over the past thirty years.21  The impact of 
climate change in the Arctic is more drastic than anywhere else 
in the world.22  The temperature increase in the Arctic is twice 
that of the rest of the globe, and the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment estimates that by 2100, the increase in temperature 
will vary between two and nine degrees Celsius.23  As 
temperatures increase, the major obstacle to offshore drilling—
sea ice in the Arctic—will “melt away.”24  Studies have also 
identified the area where sea ice is expected to last the longest, 
which is generally referred to as the “Last Ice Area,” which will 
provide critical future habitats for species needing such ice.25 
Figure 2: Decline of Sea Ice Over Time (Source: National Snow and Ice 
Data Center)26 
 
20.  Sea ice is frozen ocean water.  Sea ice undergoes an annual cyclical pattern—it 
forms, grows, melts and circulates in the ocean.  Sea Ice, WORLD WILDLIFE FED’N, 
http://www.wwf.ca/conservation/arctic/sea_ice/ [https://perma.cc/EB22-EYPG] (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
21.  Quick Facts on Arctic Sea Ice, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CENTER, 
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/quickfacts/seaice.html [https://perma.cc/GD4S-KSKR] (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2019).  
22.  Climate Change in the Arctic, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CENTER, 
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/climate_change.html 
[https://perma.cc/44Z8-HWVM] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
23.  SUSAN JOY HOSSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A WARMING 
ARCTIC (2004); see  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (Martin Parry et al. eds., 
2007). 
24.  Timo Koivurova & Kamrul Hossain, Arctic:  Can it be Done Sustainably?, OIL, GAS & 
ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 2012, at 1, 4. 
25.  See supra note 21. 
26.  Jonathan Masters, The Thawing Arctic: Risks and Opportunities, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/thawing-arctic-risks-and-
opportunities. 
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C. The Environmental Problem of Offshore Drilling 
Oil and gas activities in the Arctic are harmful and hazardous.27  
If large-scale oil production proceeds in the Arctic, both chronic 
and acute releases of oil will inevitably occur.28  Physical drilling is 
highly polluting and there will be demonstrable effects on Arctic 
wildlife.  Offshore rigs pollute their surrounding marine 
environment because of pipeline leaks and release of drilling fluid, 
metal cuttings including toxic metals such as lead, chromium, and 
mercury, and carcinogens such as benzene.29  Oil exploration 
activities are hazardous to the extent that there is a high probability 
of a catastrophic spill and blowout.30 
Should an oil spill occur in the Arctic, cold temperatures, low 
degradation rates, and hazardous conditions could interfere with 
the response.31  The remoteness of the region, lack of existing 
infrastructure, and the region’s vast size will likely hinder response 
times to future oil spills.32  Increased storm surges could also mean 
that pollution is more likely to reach the shore, damaging coastal 
species.33  Beyond the lack of capacity to immediately remedy any 
spills in the region, exposure to oil spills likely will injure or kill 
seals, contaminate prey populations such as sea birds and fish, and 
impact the entire food web of the Arctic system.  Since fur 
contaminated with oil begins to mat and lose its ability to retain 
heat and water, marine mammals with fur are more vulnerable to 
oil spills than other aquatic life.34  Where dispersants are used, fish 
 
27.  In this context, hazardous means risky and dangerous, while harmful means injurious 
and damaging to environments and marine species. 
28.  R. W. Macdonald & J. M. Bewers, Contaminants in the Arctic Marine Environment:  
Priorities for Protection, 53 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 537, 555 (1996). 
29.  Impacts of Offshore Drilling, OCEANA, https://web.archive.org/web/20180317201143/ 
http://usa.oceana.org/impacts-offshore-drilling [https://perma.cc/9MZ3-NQ95] (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
30.  Id. 
31.  Reiersen et al., supra note 7, at 30. 
32.  How would offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic impact wildlife?, WORLD WILDLIFE 
FED’N, https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/how-would-offshore-oil-and-gas-drilling-in-the-
arctic-impact-wildlife [https://perma.cc/TH9F-UAD2] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).  
33.  RACHAEL LORNA JOHNSTONE, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 12–13 (Queen Mary Studies in Int’l Law, Volume 14, 2014). 
34.  ENVTL. RESEARCH INST, DENMARK MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, POTENTIAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF Oil SPILLS IN GREENLAND 66 (Anders Mosbech ed., 2002); see also 
Jennifer Kennedy, Effects of Oil Spills on Marine Life, THOUGHTCO (Mar. 16, 2018).  
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eggs and larvae could be exposed to harmful concentrations of oil 
components.35 
No major spills have occurred in the region to date.36  Thus, 
there is no data and little to no understanding of the uncertainties 
related to such accidents in the region.37  Weidemann further adds 
that “[e]xperience from the subarctic Exxon Valdez spill also shows 
that exposure to oil spills can last for decades for aquatic 
animals . . . and the long-term effects of such spills on ecosystems 
are still poorly understood.”38  However, the absence of a spill 
should not be taken to mean that it is safe to drill.  With melting 
sea ice and the corresponding increase in extractive activities, 
pollution events are likely to increase. 
Pollution in the Arctic is also unlikely to stay localized.  A 
warming climate is not just melting the Arctic’s sea ice; it is stirring 
the remaining ice faster.39  During the winter months, it is possible 
for contaminants to be frozen into the sea ice and then transported 
across the ocean as sea ice drifts.40  As a result, any oil pollution 
from shipping routes or offshore drilling may be ice-rafted to 
neighboring countries and their maritime boundaries.  Thereafter, 
as sea ice melts in the summer, these contaminants will be released 
in new territories.  It is an unfortunate coincidence that the release 
of contaminants in sea ice into the marine environment occurs at 
the site of maximum ocean productivity: along the ice edge.41  Ice-
edge phytoplankton form part of the bottom of the Arctic food 
web, and such pollution could impact the occurrence of 
phytoplankton blooms.42 
It is worth noting that the Arctic region is a “sink” for a multitude 
of pollutants from all around the world, including, but not limited 
 
35.  ENVTL. RESEARCH INST, supra note 34, at 80. 
36.  Parul Tewari, What would an oil spill mean for the Arctic?, IIASA NEXUS (Aug. 16, 2017), 
http://blog.iiasa.ac.at/2017/08/16/what-would-an-oil-spill-mean-for-the-arctic/ 
[https://perma.cc/552U-SDP9] (noting that the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William 
Sound came close to the Arctic Circle). 
37.  Id. 
38.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 33. 
39.  Robert Newton et al., Increasing Transnational Sea‐Ice Exchange in a Changing Arctic 
Ocean, 5 EARTH’S FUTURE 633, 633 (2017). 
40.  See id. at 635. 
41.  Reiersen et al., supra note 7, at 18–19.  
42.  Observing Arctic Ice-edge Plankton Blooms from Space, SCI. DAILY (Mar. 4, 2011), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/03/110304115609.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GZ62-UBJX]. 
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to, persistent organic pollutants and radioactive waste.43  It is 
extremely difficult to identify each type of pollutant and its 
source.44  However, addressing all such global pollutants is beyond 
the scope of this Note.  This Note focuses on the regional 
transboundary harm from Arctic States’ extractive hydrocarbon 
activities in their exclusive economic zones. 
D. Current Sources of Authority 
1. Arctic Council 
The Artic Council is composed of eight sovereign member states 
that hold Arctic territory.45  Working groups within the Arctic 
Council assess the economic, environmental, and social conditions 
of the Arctic, and produce reports and recommendations for 
adoption by member States.46  Both the Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna Working Group (“CAFF”), which addresses the 
conservation of Arctic biodiversity, and the Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment Working Group (“PAME”), which ensures the 
protection and sustainable use of the Arctic marine environment, 
are concerned with oil pollution in the Arctic.47  Based on their 
reports and recommendations, the Council expects its members to 
undertake voluntary commitments and adoptions to protect the 
Arctic.48  The Council does not and cannot impose mandatory 
obligations on its participants.49  It also does not have any 
enforcement mechanisms.50  While the lack of enforcement limits 
 
43.  Arctic Pollution Issues 2014: Trends in Persistent Organic Pollutants, Radioactivity, and 
Human Health in the Arctic - Policy-makers Summary, AMAP 1–2 (Mar. 2015) 
https://www.amap.no/documents/download/2222/inline[https://perma.cc/N5CS-WY9V]. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Member States, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2015), https://arctic-council.org/index. 
php/en/about-us/member-states [https://perma.cc/SV7N-UCKW]. 
46.  See Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2015), https://arctic-council.org/ 
index.php/en/about-us/working-groups [https://perma.cc/CB5B-WL9X]. 
47.  CAFF Working Group, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2015), https://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/caff; PAME Working Group, ARCTIC 
COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2015), https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-
groups/pame. 
48.   Heather Exner-Pirot et al., Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council, THE 
ARCTIC INST. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-
council/ [https://perma.cc/5RZ5-QAUZ]. 
49.  Id. 
50.  The Arctic Council:  A Backgrounder, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept. 13, 2018), https://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us [https://perma.cc/4XAZ-RUCG] (“The Arctic Council 
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the efficacy of the Arctic Council, the Council still has the capacity 
to provide a wide-angle lens to threats to the Arctic and can 
facilitate coordination among its member states to address a 
transboundary oil problem.51  For example, the Arctic Council has 
published the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in 
partnership with representatives of other governments, non-
governmental organizations, industry, indigenous people, and the 
scientific community.  Though the guidelines are non-binding, 
they are intended to encourage the highest standards currently 
available.52 
For each of the treaties or conventions that follow, the following 




Canada Russia Greenland 
(Denmark) 
Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
UNCLOS X ✓ Partly ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
ESPOO X X X ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ 
OPRC ✓ Partly X ✓ Partly ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OSPAR X X X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
CBA X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
ACPB ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X 
Table 1: Treaties and their Status of Ratification by Arctic State53 
 
does not and cannot implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments or recommendations.  
That responsibility belongs to each individual Arctic State.”). 
51.  See infra Part III. 
52.  LINDA NOWLAN, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, ARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 
FOR ENVTL PROT., Policy and Law Paper No. 44 IUCN Environmental Law Program 36 
(2001). 
53 Participants to Law of the Sea, United Nations Treaty Collection, available online at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/622J-ZZLG] (last accessed 
Dec. 23, 2019); Participants to Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, United Nations Treaty Collection, available online at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
4&chapter=27&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/KF2B-PPP6] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019); 
Participants to International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and 
Cooperation, United Nations Treaty Collection, available online at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800aada6 
[https://perma.cc/MWB4-38YH] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019); Participants to OSPAR, OSPAR 
Commission, available online at https://www.ospar.org/organisation/contracting-parties 
[https://perma.cc/2Z8Z-PDNK] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019); List of Parties Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Convention on Biological Diversity, 
https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q4ZV-QHTQ] (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2019); Preamble, Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears, 
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2. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”) 
UNCLOS was developed to provide a framework to balance the 
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources and the prevention of 
marine pollution.  Articles 194 and 195 of UNCLOS deal with oil 
pollution specifically, and others address the marine environment 
in the Arctic and emphasize the importance of minimizing oil 
pollution.54  Articles 78, 206, and 208 govern the freedoms of 
“other States.”55  Article 78 specifically provides that in exercising 
its own rights on its continental shelf, a coastal State must not 
“infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference” with any rights 
and freedoms of other States.  Article 206 requires that States that 
undertake polluting activities report any “significant and harmful 
changes to the marine environment.”  Article 194 requires States to 
take “individually or jointly as appropriate” all measures “to reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment.”  It also 
mandates that member states take “all measures necessary” to 
ensure that any pollution from activities under their jurisdiction is 
minimized and does not cause transboundary damage to other 
States and their environments.  Under Article 194, member states 
have to “harmonize their policies” on this front.  Article 195 
requires that the measures taken in Article 194 do not “transform 
one type of pollution into another” and do not indirectly transfer 
the pollution to another area.  Finally, while Article 234 does relate 
to “ice-covered areas,” it covers only the rights of coastal states to 
adopt and enforce regulations for preventing and controlling 
marine pollution from vessels inside ice-covered areas within their 
exclusive economic zones.56  As detailed above, this article does not 
discuss transboundary pollution from drilling activities or vessels 
outside State EEZs.  Under Article 208, member states should 
establish regional rules and periodically review the effectiveness of 
the implemented policies.  When read together, articles 78, 206, 
194, and 195, suggest that the eight countries that constitute the 
Arctic Council will need to coordinate their extractive activities in 
order to minimize marine pollution and impacts to each other. 
 
http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/agreements/agreement1973.html [https://perma.cc/G8T8-
N4KN] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
54.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 194, 195. 
55.  Id. at arts. 78, 206, 208. 
56.  Id. at art. 234. 
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3. Espoo Convention 
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context (“Espoo Convention”) sets out the 
obligations of Parties to assess the environmental impact of certain 
activities through a transboundary environmental assessment 
(“TEA”).57  In 2004, the Parties adopted an amendment qualifying 
the types of offshore hydrocarbon activities that would trigger the 
TEA requirement.  Effective October 23, 2017, States must 
undertake a TEA when petroleum and natural gas extraction 
exceeds 500 metric tons/day for petroleum or 500,000 cubic 
meters/day for natural gas.58 
Although the Espoo Convention is the primary legal basis for an 
Arctic TEA, it is not the only treaty that provides for TEAs.  There 
are many applicable bilateral treaties between the Nordic states, 
between the U.S. and Canada, and between Canada and Denmark 
(Greenland).59  However, there are also maritime zones that are 
not covered by treaties beyond Espoo, such as those between Russia 
and other Arctic States.60  Like Espoo, these TEAs set out minimum 
requirements, but, unlike Espoo, there is no standardized 
approach across the States. 
4. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response, and Cooperation (“OPRC”) 
The OPRC Convention applies to all vessels and submersibles 
operating in the marine environment, fixed or floating offshore 
installations or structures engaged in gas or oil exploration and 
exploitation, and sea ports and oil handling facilities.61  Parties are 
required to have emergency plans in the event of a spill, and States 
are required to inform other States whose interests are affected, or 
 
57.  Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 
25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention]; About the ESPOO Convention, 
UNECE, https://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/conventions/environmental-assessm 
ent/about-us/espoo-convention/enveiaeia/more.html [https://perma.cc/629A-ABHF] (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
58.  Espoo Convention Appendix I. https://www.unece.org/env/eia/about/ 
eia_text.html#appendix1. 
59.  Timo Koivurova, Transboundary Environmental Assessment in the Arctic, 26 IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL 265, 269 (2008). 
60.  Id. 
61.  International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Responsiveness, and 
Cooperation art. 1, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter OPRC]. 
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are likely to be affected.62  While some cost sharing mechanisms to 
oil pollution remediation are detailed in the Annex of this 
Convention, larger questions of restoration, enforcement, and 
liability remain open.63  Despite the Convention’s promising title, it 
does not actually govern the substantive mechanisms of 
hydrocarbon extraction. 
5. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic(“OSPAR”) 
The OSPAR convention provides an ecosystem approach for 
protections against marine pollution in the North-East Atlantic.64  
Region I of OSPAR (which is approximately 40% of all of the 
OSPAR area) covers parts of the Arctic. In particular, Annex III 
deals with pollution from offshore resources, and Articles 4 and 5 
consider the assessment and protection of ecosystems and 
biological diversity.  OSPAR is guided by six strategies, including 
the OSPAR strategy on Environmental Goals and Management 
Mechanisms for Offshore Activities.  OSPAR operates through a 
Commission that tracks the conditions of the maritime area and 
the effectiveness of the adopted measures.65 
6. Treaties on Biological Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) and the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (“ACPB”) both aim 
to protect critical wildlife in the Arctic ecosystem.  While neither 
the Arctic, nor ice-covered areas are mentioned explicitly in the 
CBD, the convention does indirectly protect Arctic species through 
its articles governing conservation and sustainable use (Article 6), 
identification and monitoring (Article 7), and in-situ conservation 
(Article 8).66  Article 8 of the CBD discusses the establishment of a 
system of protected areas to conserve biological diversity.67  Article 
 
62.  OPRC, supra note 61, at art. III. 
63.  Id. at annex 1(a).  
64.  Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
Annex III, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter OSPAR]; see also, WEIDEMANN, supra 
note 8 at 100. 
65.  supra. note 64, at Art. 10.  
66.  Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 6–8, Jun. 5, 1992, 2076 U.N.T.S. 579 
[hereinafter CBD]. 
67.  Donald R. Rothwell, Global Environmental Protection Instruments and the Polar Marine 
Environment, in PROTECTING THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT 57, 73 (Davor Vidas ed., 2000). 
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8 is therefore, the legal hook for developing a network of marine 
protected areas in the Arctic.  Indeed, CAFF (the working group of 
the Arctic Council) has essentially “mirrored the function of the 
CBD in the Arctic.”68  The ACPB relies on each contracting party to 
take actions that they deem suitable to “protect the ecosystems of 
which polar bears are a part.”69  By taking an ecosystem approach, 
the ACPB aims to protect the polar bears as well as their food 
chains and habitats.  Parties to the ACPB have explicitly agreed to 
reduce other stressors including habitat destruction and 
pollution.70 
7. National Laws and Bilateral Treaties 
Bilateral agreements and national laws are inadequate to address 
transboundary oil pollution.71  Some Arctic States have strong 
management regulations for pollution abatement, while measures 
and laws in other States, such as Russia, remain painfully opaque.72  
This patchwork of national legislation over a transnational region is 
complicated for operators, insurers, and those policing industrial 
practices to navigate.73  Importantly, the United States has the Oil 
Pollution Act (“OPA”) that governs the offshore development of 
hydrocarbon resources.74  While OPA protects waters of the United 
States from oil spills and other pollution from activities within its 
exclusive economic zone, the law, unfortunately, does not extend 
so far as to hold parties responsible for transboundary oil pollution.75  
 
68.  Gloria Dickie, Taking the Pulse of the Arctic’s Biological Diversity, ARCTIC DEEPLY (Feb. 8, 
2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/articles/2017/02/08/taking-the-pulse-of-the-
arctics-biological-diversity [https://perma.cc/27JY-9ADP]. 
69.  Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears art. II, Nov. 15, 1973, 2898 U.N.T.S. 
243 [hereinafter ACPB]. 
70.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 107. 
71.  While there are bilateral agreements between Denmark-Canada, Russia-Norway, 
Russia-U.S., and Canada-U.S. regarding cooperation on pollution control in Arctic waters, 
these agreements lack mandatory obligation, enforcement and, dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  Keil, Kathrin, Spreading Oil, Spreading Conflict? Institutions Regulating Arctic Oil 
and Gas Activities, 50 THE INT’L SPECTATOR:  ITALIAN J. INT’L AFFAIRS 85, 100–106 (2015). 
72.  Sarah Gulas et al., Declining Arctic Ocean Oil and Gas Developments:  Opportunities to 
Improve Governance and Environmental Pollution Control, 75 MARINE POL’Y 53, 58 (2017). 
73.  Erin King, A critical review of hydrocarbon exploitation and shipping governance measures for 
oil pollution prevention and preparedness in the Arctic, School of Marine Science and 
Engineering, Plymouth University, Drakes Circus, PL4 8AA (2016). 
74.  33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1990).  
75.  33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1990).  This section makes clear that the discharge, or threat of a 
discharge of oil, must be “into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the 
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Indeed, while the waters of the United States within its EEZ may be 
affected by such transboundary pollution, under current 
international laws, there is no mechanism for actors to be 
sanctioned. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND APPLICATION 
International environmental regimes, including the various rules 
and programs governing the Arctic, have emerged to respond to 
environmental concerns in the region.  As Oran Young and Marc 
Levy describe, these regimes achieve their outcomes through a 
range of mechanisms.  Young suggests several inquiries to assess the 
effectiveness of environmental regimes:  Does the regime impose 
mandatory obligations, and does it affect the cost calculus of 
participants?  Does the regime consider, monitor, and build on 
scientific understanding of the problem?  Does the regime 
coordinate internally and externally with similar regimes?76  This 
section will engage in these inquiries to assess the efficacy of 
existing Arctic authorities. 
A. Utility Modifier 
Regimes become effective at changing behavior when they can 
change a participant’s rationale—i.e., when they can affect the 
costs and benefits of a participant’s actions within the regime.77  
Especially where there are multiple actors, as in most 
transboundary pollution issues, agreements that aim to maximize 
participation, provide funding, and create liability schemes to keep 
all member states accountable will be more effective in addressing 
the problem. 
Young suggests that state actors within a regime are self-
interested utility maximizers who will comply with international 
arrangements to the extent that these regimes alter their costs and 
 
exclusive economic zone.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  As such, ice rafted oil pollution would not 
be covered by OPA. 
76.  Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, 
in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 1, 3–10 (Oran R. Young 
eds., 1999).  
77.  Lawrence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 ILL. L.R. 91–96 
(2008); see also David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 1, 12 (David G. Victor et 
al. eds., 1998). 
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benefits.78  In particular, mandatory obligations (such as 
monitoring, preventive technology, and cleanup obligations) add 
costs, while resource access provides benefits.79  This section will 
thus investigate the extent to which the existing framework of 
regulations attaches liability and costs to prevent marine pollution 
on parties in the Arctic.  Implicit in such an inquiry are questions 
of participation and funding, as well as liability. 
1. Participation and Funding 
Many of the treaties and laws that govern the Arctic do not have 
the complete participation of all Arctic States.80  As described in 
Table 1 above, not all Arctic States are parties to all of the 
conventions governing marine pollution in the Arctic.  
Furthermore, some key treaties like UNCLOS, OSPAR, and 
ESPOO, have not been ratified by the United States.81 
Even the Arctic Council, which is meant to be a representative 
body of States in the Arctic, has had participation problems.  In the 
past few years, five Arctic littoral states have held exclusive 
meetings.  At one of these exclusive meetings, these States signed 
the “Ilulissat Declaration,” which not only rejected proposals for a 
new legal regime concerning the marine arctic, it also refused to 
engage with non-Arctic States in resolving Arctic issues.82  Yet, these 
non-Arctic States may increasingly affect the Arctic environment.  
As the sea ice recedes and new shipping routes and resources 
become accessible, the Arctic will draw interest from many non-
Arctic States including, importantly, China.83  In order to protect 
the Arctic marine environment from all sources of pollution, 
including those by non-Arctic countries seeking passage, regime 
participation will have to accommodate these expanding interests.  
More broadly, limited participation makes it hard to uniformly 
 
78.  Oran R. Young, International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions, 39 WORLD 
POL 104, 118 (1986). 
79.  Id. at 119. 
80.  See supra Table 1. 
81.  The U.S. recognizes UNCLOS as a codification of customary international law.  The 
U.S. accepted all the parts of the Convention except the Part XI to be customary law as well.  
MICHAEL BYERS, WHO OWNS THE ARCTIC?:  UNDERSTANDING SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES IN THE 
NORTH 90 (2009). 
82.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 58.   
83.  Id. at 60–62. 
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address marine pollution concerns with standardized mechanisms 
such as protected areas or transboundary pollution monitoring. 
Furthermore, an assessment of participation is incomplete 
without analyzing the extent to which existing agreements have 
enabled the meaningful participation of indigenous groups.  The 
special role for indigenous peoples as Permanent Participants is a 
unique feature of the Arctic Council.84  Yet the participation of 
indigenous peoples is limited to presenting proposals for 
cooperative activities and attendance at all meetings.85  
Nevertheless, there has been some success in creating an 
indigenous peoples’ knowledge database, a study on ice edge 
ecosystem and indigenous knowledge, and a set of ethical 
principles for research.86  Indigenous groups also pushed the 
passage of the Persistent Organic Pollutants (“POPs”) Treaty.87  
The POPs treaty “implements control measures for the production, 
use, import, export, and disposal of POPs.”88 
Development of hydrocarbon resources has the potential to 
threaten the traditional values and economies of indigenous 
societies.89  Indeed, indigenous groups were involved in the 
drafting of the Arctic Council’s Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines.90  These successes suggest that indigenous peoples have 
played an important role in transforming the scientific facts 
sponsored by the Arctic Council to give such scientific research 
more salience in international environmental diplomacy.91  Their 
knowledge and values should be included in any new agreement 
addressing transboundary oil pollution, and in any regional 
guidelines on resource extraction.  It is an unfortunate dilemma 
that treaty design forces a trade-off between participation and 
enforcement and liability.92  Expanding the reach of the treaty to 
encompass new member states likely requires existing states to 
 
84.  NOWLAN, supra note 52, at 10.  
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. at 11. 
87.  “Indigenous peoples could show how persistent organic pollutants are deleterious to 
human health in the immediate and long term.”  Timo Koivurova, The Arctic Council:  A 
Testing Ground for New International Environmental Governance, 19 BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 
131, 135 (2012).  
88.  NOWLAN, supra note 52, at 24. 
89.  Id. at 38. 
90.  Id. at 36. 
91.  Koivurova, supra note 87, at 141. 
92.  Supra note 77, at 71–126. 
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compromise on enforcement mechanisms.  Yet, on the other hand, 
increasing enforcement mechanisms, such as broadening what 
behavior is sanctionable or increasing the burden sanctions would 
impose, would likely limit participation. 
2. Liability 
For the purposes of this section, liability in utility modification 
addresses both the idea of enforcement mechanisms (holding a 
state actor accountable) as well as compensation for harms done to 
another state’s marine environment.  In the patchwork of 
regulations that come together to manage the Arctic, none have 
strong enforcement mechanisms, penalty clauses, or timeframes for 
environmental assessments.93  The Arctic Council, founded by a 
soft-law declaration, has no power to establish legally binding duties 
for member states.94  The Council relies entirely on voluntary 
actions and the goodwill of member countries.  For example, with 
respect to oil and gas activities, the Council suggests that member 
states adopt the precautionary principle and provides guidelines on 
how to sustainably extract hydrocarbon resources.95  Furthermore, 
the guidelines ask the Arctic governments to set domestic discharge 
standards resulting from oil and gas activities.96  Yet, to date, no 
Arctic State has assessed operator compliance with domestic laws.97  
Similarly, with respect to Marine Protected Areas (“MPAs”) in the 
region, the council asks each Arctic State to “pursue MPA 
development based on its own authorities, priorities and 
timelines.”98  As such, not only is the network limited to areas 
within each coastal state’s EEZ, MPAs are not standardized across 
countries, there is no concerted effort to establish MPAs in the 
 
93.  See supra Part III. 
94.  Camille Escudé & Joël Plouffe, How The Arctic Council Sets The Tone For International 
Cooperation, WORLD POLICY (Apr. 12, 2017), https://worldpolicy.org/2017/04/12/how-the-
arctic-council-sets-the-tone-for-international-cooperation/ [https://perma.cc/PR4P-CP5K]. 
95.  Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, ARTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 29, 2009), 
www.pame.is/images/03_ Projects/Offshore Oil andGas/OffshoreOil-andGas/Arctic-
Guidelines-2009-13th-Mar2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2EJ-WL98]. 
96.  Id. at 31, 35. 
97.  Helene Mayrand, Arctic Community of Practice and Offshore Oil and Gas Activities: 
Determining the Legal and Political Dimensions of the Obligation to Prevent, Reduce, and Control 
Pollution, 11 MCGILL INT’L J. SUST. DEV. L. & POL’Y 257, 280 (2015). 
98.  Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of Marine Protected Areas, ARCTIC COUNCIL 5 (Apr. 
2015), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/417/MPA_final_web.p 
df?sequence=1&isAllowed=y  [https://perma.cc/EXZ7-TRRF]. 
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Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (“ABNJ”), and it is unclear 
when such MPAs will be established if at all.99  Thus far, only 
Canada has set up an MPA.100  The lack of a need to commit to 
limiting marine pollution in concrete regulations means that the 
Council can be seen as a “talking shop with no powers to prevent 
any individual state from pressing ahead with development in the 
Arctic.”101  Indeed, Arctic States have explicitly decided that no new 
Arctic specific legal mechanism is needed and instead choose to 
rely entirely on UNCLOS and the rights and obligations granted 
therein.102 
The language of UNCLOS however, only goes so far.  First, 
UNCLOS was designed to be an umbrella regulation.  That is, it 
was meant to be read in conjunction with further implementing 
regulations.103  It does not contain comprehensive prohibitive or 
protective regulations for the marine environment.  The language 
of UNCLOS Art. 194 only sets minimum standards for pollution 
protection.104  Keeping in mind the fragility and uniqueness of the 
Arctic ecosystem, and the limited scientific understanding of the 
impacts of oil spills and dispersion in these environments, these 
minimum standards are unlikely to be enough to protect the Arctic 
marine environment.  As a liability mechanism for pollution within 
an EEZ, recourse through UNCLOS remains limited.  Under 
Article 235(2), natural and legal persons should have access to 
remedies in court for damage to the marine environment.  Yet, it is 
not clear where persons would derive standing, or in which courts 
they would be able to bring a claim for damages done to marine 
environments.  Thus far, states have exploited and profited from 
this ambiguity.105 
 
99.  Marine Protected Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, Pew Trust (Mar. 22, 2016); 
Governing areas beyond national jurisdiction, IUCN available online at 
https://www.iucn.org/resources/issues-briefs/governing-areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction 
(last accessed Oct. 21, 2019). 
100.  Sarah Gibbens, Pristine Arctic reserves will benefit wildlife and Inuit communities, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/07/ 
canadian-arctic-reserves-to-benefit-wildlife-inuit/ [https://perma.cc/Y6V2-4BDF]. 
101.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 55. 
102.  Jon D. Carlson et al., Scramble for the Arctic: Layered Sovereignty, UNCLOS, and 
Competing Maritime Territorial Claims, 33 SAIS REV. OF INT’L AFF. 21 (2013). 
103.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 129.   
104.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 194.  
105.  JOHNSTONE, supra note 33, at 267.  
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Finally, UNCLOS does not explicitly detail how, and to what 
extent, states must monitor the consequences of their offshore 
extractive activities—both within their territorial waters or 
transboundary impacts.  States have to monitor and report any 
polluting activity “as far as practicable” under Article 78.  Article 
206 also gives member states the discretion to determine when 
there is “substantial pollution” or “significant and harmful changes 
to the marine environment.”106  As outlined previously in Section 
1.C, where the environmental effects and conditions are poorly 
understood, such discretion does not safeguard the Arctic from 
pollution.  Further, “as far as practicable” gives States the 
opportunity to evade the continued transboundary environmental 
assessment entirely.  Article 198 provides some rudimentary 
transboundary pollution assessment.  It states that “when a State 
becomes aware of cases in which the marine environment has been 
damaged by pollution, it shall immediately notify other States it 
deems likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the 
competent international organizations.”107  Beyond these notice 
procedures, however, the polluting State’s liability does not attach 
to the pollution under UNCLOS.  While Espoo was meant to 
address such transboundary assessments, it remains unclear when a 
TEA is triggered.108  The inherent vagueness of activities that are 
likely to cause substantial harm makes it difficult to evaluate 
cumulative impacts and can leave particularly sensitive areas 
unprotected.109  Even if a TEA is conducted, Espoo doesn’t outline 
what liability should attach to a country found to be responsible for 
transboundary pollution.110  As such, the member state responsible 
for the pollution does not seem to have any attached obligation 
based on international convention to remedy the pollution, such as 
a polluter pays principle.  A final problem inherent to all TEAs 
triggered by a “substantial” or “significant” requirement is a 
circularity problem.  One cannot know that the impacts of an 
extractive activity are substantial or significant without an EIA.111 
 
106.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 133. 
107.  UNCLOS Art. 198. 
108.  Espoo Convention, supra note 57, art. III. 
109.  Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Evaluating Espoo: What Protection Does the Espoo Convention 
Offer the Arctic Marine Environment?, 5 Y.B. POLAR L. 337, 346 (2013). 
110.  See Espoo Convention, supra note 85. 
111.  Id. at 348. 
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OSPAR has similar liability issues as UNCLOS Articles 204-206.  
Firstly, while Article 5 and Annex III stress the importance of taking 
all possible measures to prevent and eliminate pollution and 
discuss the adoption of best available techniques and best 
environmental practice, they do not detail what liability should 
attach in the event of pollution.  In Annex V, parties are only 
required to restore marine areas “where practicable,” and States 
have the discretion to determine what measures are necessary.112  
The measures that member states must take to protect and 
conserve ecosystems (established in Article 5, Annex III, and Annex 
V) are not standardized.  Indeed, discharges and emissions from 
offshore sources are regulated by the competent authorities of each 
State.113  Countries will inevitably have various levels of 
enforcement on marine pollution.  As such, the Arctic marine 
system will not be uniformly protected.  Article 21 of OSPAR does 
go further than the previous agreements in addressing 
transboundary pollution.  OSPAR provides for negotiation of a 
cooperation agreement through the Commission.114  As previously 
detailed in Table 1, however, three key Arctic States are not 
members to OSPAR, and negotiated agreements through OSPAR 
would not apply to them. 
The CBD and the ACPB both similarly lack enforcement powers.  
The CBD, for example, has language that requires protected areas 
to be established “where necessary” or “as far as possible and as 
appropriate.”115  The impact assessments required by the CBD and 
their reciprocity with other States mirrors that in UNCLOS.  The 
CBD does not define “significant adverse effects” or “imminent or 
grave damage.”  CBD terms are vague, and implementation is 
uncertain.116  While CBD disputes are settled by arbitration, the 
convention does not outline any liability or cost-sharing for actions 
that adversely affect biodiversity.117  Given the migratory species 
that use the Arctic seascape, biodiversity impacts are likely to affect 
more than one State.118  Yet, the CBD has no provision for 
 
112.  OSPAR, supra note 64, at Annex V. 
113.  See id. at art. 2 (states shall “adopt programs” to prevent pollution). 
114.  Id. at art. 21. 
115.  CBD, supra note 66, arts. 8–9. 
116.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 108. 
117.  See CBD, supra note 66. 
118.  Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative, CAFF, available online at https://www.caff.is/arctic-
migratory-birds-initiative-ambi (the map indicates that Arctic migratory birds travel long 
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addressing such transboundary impacts.  The ACPB, while laudable 
for its ecosystem approach to conservation of the marine 
environment, lacks both a standardized approach to protection and 
an ongoing mechanism for review or amendment.119  The 
agreement gives states discretion on what constitutes “appropriate 
action” for protecting the ecosystem.120 
Enforcement is but one side of the liability coin. Enforcement 
requires the polluting party to accept responsibility.  The other 
component to liability is ensuring adequate compensation or 
penalty mechanism for remediating the pollution.  Thus far, there 
is no international compensation mechanism for pollution from 
offshore drilling platforms.121  This fact is particularly surprising 
since there is a very clear compensation mechanism for oil 
pollution from transportation tankers.  Established under the 
auspices of the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage and the 1971 International Convention on 
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention), anyone in a 
member state of these conventions which has suffered pollution 
damage caused by oil transported by a tanker can claim 
compensation from the ship owner or insurer and, if applicable, 
the Supplementary Fund.122 
Although Young suggests the utility modifier as an axis upon 
which to evaluate the effectiveness of a regime, in practice this may 
not yield the full picture as to why regimes may succeed or fail.123  
First, the outcomes of recent elections suggest that more than a 
mere cost calculus, states may choose to enter (or not enter) into 
 
ranges covering many countries).  Tero Mustonen & Violet Ford, Indigenous Peoples and 
Biodiversity in the Arctic, in ARCTIC BIODIVERSITY ASSESSMENT (Hans Meltofte ed., 2013), 
https://www.arcticbiodiversity.is/index.php/the-report/chapters/indigenous-peoples-and-
biodiversity-in-the-arctic [https://perma.cc/D6U8-PMEC]. 
119.  ACPB, supra note 69, at Art. II (outlining that States should “protect the ecosystem” 
but the treaty as a whole says nothing about how or when to monitor). 
120.  Id. 
121.  Robert Beckman & Zhen Sun, Ctr. For Int’l Law, Regulatory Gaps in Offshore 
Activities in the Arctic:  Concerns and Lessons from Southeast Asia, Presentation Before the 
Arctic Energy Summit (Sep. 18–20, 2017), https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Regulation_Gaps-Sun-Zhen.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3DT-
WWB7].  
122.  Id.; see also Explanatory Note, THE INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS (July 
2019) https://iopcfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/explanatory_note_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/969T-G8X4]. 
123.  Young, supra note 75, at 22. 
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certain treaties and regulations based on the views of certain 
constituencies that managed to prevail in a national election.124  
Second, there are trade-offs between participation and liability.  
The more teeth a treaty has, the less likely it is to have more 
member States.  For example, the Agreement on the Conservation 
of Polar Bears had to trade liability mechanisms for strong 
participation.  Nevertheless, it is a useful first step in understanding 
how to improve existing agreements or to leverage gaps in 
understanding to convince state actors to achieve standardization 
in their approaches to tackling marine pollution. 
From the analysis above, the frameworks which govern the Arctic 
are not strong utility modifiers.  Indeed, in many treaties both 
participation and liability mechanisms are lacking.  As such, 
solutions that improve the utility modification of the Arctic regime 
must consider ways to frame the problem that will enable a greater 
participation without compromising liability schemes.  One way to 
do this may be to construct this problem as one of “mutual assured 
destruction” (MAD).  The MAD theory hinges on finding a sweet 
spot in the balance of power between opposing states such that 
both sides are rationally deterred from beginning conflict for fear 
of retaliation.125  In large part, the MAD theory assumes that States 
are self-interested actors who will avoid actions that can be turned 
against them.126  Treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are thought to have 
been based on MAD theories.127 
 
124.  See, e.g., Ali Vitali, Trump Pulls out of Paris Agreement, NBC (Jun. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-pulls-u-s-out-paris-climate-
agreement-n767066 [https://perma.cc/JWW9-HUUQ]. 
125.  John Swift, The Soviet-American Arms Race, HIST. TODAY (Mar. 2009), 
https://www.historytoday.com/archive/soviet-american-arms-race 
[https://perma.cc/KW9A-A56K]; see also Alexander J. Field, Schelling, von Neumann, and the 
Event that Didn’t Occur, 5 GAMES 53, 77–78, 81 (2014).  Note, however, that the success of 
mutual assured destruction framework requires asymmetric assumptions about the 
rationality of the two parties, i.e., “[e]ach had to believe that they were rational, but their 
adversary was not.”  In part this may require creating the perception that the other would be 
willing to explore in the Arctic.  Without such asymmetric assumptions, deterrence cannot 
be achieved.  Field, supra, at 78. 
126.  Field, supra note 125, at 81 (“[T]o assume rational choice is to assume that people 
(or countries) act so as efficiently to advance their material self-interest.”). 
127.  HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, GETTING MAD:  NUCLEAR MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, ITS 
ORIGINS AND PRACTICE v–vi (2004), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/ 
ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB585.pdf 
 [https://perma.cc/VYM4-7GV7]. 
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Given the transboundary nature of the problem and the gravity 
of harm that could result from an offshore oil spill, states may be 
more willing to participate and create a liability mechanism if they 
understood that, while a liability scheme may impose a cost on 
them for their extractive activities, it will also protect them from the 
extractive activities of other states.  This mutually assured 
destruction framework may also incentivize states to pool together 
funds for collective and consistent monitoring in the EEZs and in 
the high seas beyond national jurisdiction.  Collective monitoring 
can help avoid the problems of biased data gathering and cherry-
picking data when a country self-polices.  Creating this mutually 
assured destruction framework, however, requires significant data 
gathering and information sharing to understand exactly how oil 
spills can affect the marine environment and move across 
boundaries. 
B. Learning Facilitators 
Regimes can also prove to be effective by creating mechanisms 
for social learning leading to a better understanding of the science 
at the root of the problem, new ideas about measures that can 
combat this problem, and better ideas for implementation.128  Such 
regimes often involve information sharing and are attentive to the 
recommendations provided by epistemic communities.129  A regime 
that is effective as a learning facilitator must have the flexibility 
within the legal mechanism for adapting the existing regulations to 
new information.130  Thus, it can be helpful to add the second 
dimension, scientific or learning, to understand efficacy. 
First, the existing regimes do not cope well with the introduction 
of new information and lack the flexibility to incorporate new 
research.  The Arctic environment is poorly understood:  scientists 
do not have complete and accurate data on the biodiversity in the 
region, the long-term impacts of oil spills, the impacts of chemical 
dispersants used to remedy spills, and the cumulative impact of 
multiple drilling operations on the marine environment.131  
Effective regulations that address marine pollution in the Arctic 
 
128.  YOUNG, supra note 75, at 261–63. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. 
131.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESPONDING TO OIL SPILLS IN THE U.S. ARCTIC MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT 2–6 (2014). 
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therefore require good baseline information to measure the extent 
of possible impacts.  While the different regimes in the Arctic have 
strong scientific study programs, there are still many gaps that need 
to be addressed.  The Arctic Council does not make clear how new 
scientific information will feed back into the regime.  In particular, 
it is not clear that the Council’s research has recognized the 
importance of ice-rafted pollution.132  By assessing 239,000 parcels 
of ice from their formation to their eventual demise, researchers 
have demonstrated the mechanism by which transboundary 
pollution could occur in the Arctic.133  The research suggests that 
there may be a similar mechanism to track where the ice source 
picked up pollutants and where it was transported.134 
Second, the existing regime does not provide a science-focused, 
standardized approach to the creation of protective areas.  As 
outlined above in Part I.D.1 of this Note, the Arctic Council does 
not provide any standards by which Marine Protected Areas are to 
be established.  The designation of MPAs by their nature must be a 
scientific endeavor: determining areas of special ecological 
significance, buffer zones for potential pollution, and networking 
of the areas require scientific data and analysis.  David Victor, 
Director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development 
at Stanford, argues that monitored activities should be reflexive 
and respond to problems of poor implementation.135  OSPAR, to its 
credit, does impose some scientific guidelines on the selection of 
MPAs.  Possible sites are identified and prioritized using the 
ecological criteria outlined in Appendix I of the treaty.136  The 
criteria however, are very broad.  For example, “ecological 
significance” is one of the factors, and it is not clear that the 
contracting party has to make a scientifically informed decision.137  
Furthermore, parties are free to determine which areas should be 
selected to be part of the OSPAR network of MPAs and how they 
 
132.  Ice rafted pollution has not been cited in the reports by the Council’s working 
groups. 
133.  Kim Martineau, As Climate Stirs Arctic Sea Ice Faster, Pollution Tags Along - 
Contaminants More Likely to Cross National Borders, Study Shows, EARTH INST.: STATE OF THE 
PLANET (Jun. 27, 2017), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2017/06/27/as-climate-stirs-arctic-
sea-ice-faster-pollution-tags-along/ [https://perma.cc/7B5V-F9QQ]. 
134.  Id. 
135.  VICTOR ET AL., supra note 77, at 16–20; see also YOUNG, supra note 75, at 3–10. 
136.  Guidance on Developing an Ecologically Coherent Network of OSPAR Marine 
Protected Areas, OSPAR Convention (2003) https://www.ospar.org/documents?d=7346. 
137.  Id. 
KANNAN FINAL MACRO 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2020  6:29 PM 
2020] Transboundary Pollution from Arctic Oil Drilling 267 
should be shaped (i.e., what activities should, or should not, be 
restricted).138 
It is not clear whether OSPAR requires monitoring within the 
MPAs once they have been established.139  Without the collection of 
baseline scientific data and continuous monitoring, the efficacy of 
any established MPAs will not be well understood.140  Similarly the 
EIAs required by UNCLOS are also lacking in such scientific 
information.  As Johnstone argues, the EIA must be, at its heart, a 
scientific enterprise conducted by a team that includes adequate 
scientific expertise.141 
OSPAR also aims to use a system of Ecological Quality Objectives 
or “EcoQO” which functions as an “overall expression of the 
structure and function of the marine ecosystem.”142  EcoQO take 
into account the biological community, geographic, climatic, and 
human factors.143  However, there has only been a pilot project of 
this indicator and it has not been integrated into the other areas 
covered by the Convention.144  Parties have questioned the 
usefulness of such an indicator and have had trouble funding such 
an enterprise.145 
OPRC, which is the only treaty that governs response to an oil 
spill, does not mention any monitoring or scientific tools to 
understand the marine environment.  OPRC specifies the actions 
that states must undertake upon receiving oil pollution reports to 
“assess the incident.”146  The lack of a scientific basis for remedial 
 
138.  See INGVILD ULRIKKE JAKOBSEN, MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
AN ARCTIC PERSPECTIVE 225 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2016). 
139.  OSPAR, supra note 64. 
140.  See Robin M. Warner, Conserving Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: Co-evolution and Interaction with the Law of the Sea, 1 FRONT. MAR. SCI. 6, 3–8 
(2014), https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2014.00006 [https://perma.cc/MT3Y-2E9L]. 
141.  JOHNSTONE, supra note 33 at 166 (“An EIA prepared by politicians, secretaries, 
economists or lawyers, without scientific input would not be in good faith.”). 
142.  OSPAR COMM’N, REPORT ON NORTH SEA PILOT PROJECT ON ECOLOGICAL QUALITY 
OBJECTIVES, 11–20 (2006), https://www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/1238/p00239 
_north_sea_pilot_project_on_ecoqo_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSH9-LSMU]. 
143.  Id. at 5. 
144.  Id. at 5, 16. 
145.  OSPAR COMM’N, EVALUATION OF THE OSPAR SYSTEM OF ECOLOGICAL QUALITY 
OBJECTIVES FOR THE NORTH SEA (updated 2010), at 3, 12–23 (2009), 
https://qsr2010.ospar.org/media/assessments/p00406_Evaluation_EcoQO_2010_update.pd
f [https://perma.cc/HG48-6F7M]. 
146.  Kristian Cedervall Lauta, A Drop in the Ocean: Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic, 5 ARCTIC REV. ON L. & POL. 227, 242 (2014), 
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operations is especially concerning in light of the issues posed by 
dispersants in the Deepwater Horizon case.147  A Joint Industry 
Program has been researching the viability of using dispersants on 
Arctic Ocean oil spills.148  Research suggests that Arctic test 
organisms did not show significant signs of toxicity and that the 
effects if any on the marine environment appeared to be “minor to 
insignificant.”149  Five oil companies pooled financial resources to 
conduct these tests and gather this information:  Shell, 
ConocoPhillips, Statoil, ExxonMobil, and BP.150  By contrast, 
government scientists at Senate hearings after the Deepwater 
Horizon Spill have testified that that the long-term effects of these 
chemicals remain a mystery.151  As well-intentioned as these 
companies may be, independent research may be worthwhile in 
validating such assertions. 
Third party actors—including insurance and risk management 
companies—have begun conducting their own research on the 
impacts of oil pollution in the Arctic.  DNV GL, a Norwegian risk 
assessment company, recently produced an Arctic Risk Assessment 
Map.  The Map, reproduced below in Figure 3, accounts for 
seasonal distribution of ice, biological assets, oil and gas resources, 
and accident history.  The vulnerability assessment was performed 
for the different ecological uses in about one hundred areas of 
heightened ecological significance within the seventeen Arctic 
Large Marine Ecosystems.  Maps such as these can be valuable as 
independent sources of authority that inform locations of MPAs. 
The tracking of threats, pollution, and transboundary effects is 




147.  See Dispersants, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/ 
programs/public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/oil_and_gas/gulf_oil_spill/disp
ersants.html [https://perma.cc/TS89-Q5GG] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019) (discussing the 
toxicity of dispersants and dispersed oil to aquatic life and humans, the long-term effects of 
which are considered unknown by the EPA). 
148.  How Would Chemical Dispersants Work on an Arctic Oil Spill?, NAT’L OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RESTORATION (July 9, 2012), 
https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/how-would-chemical-dispersants-work-
arctic-oil-spill.html [https://perma.cc/N3PM-HWC2]. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Christopher Joyce, Lasting Impact of Dispersants Unclear, Senate Told, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Aug. 4, 2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128983162 
[https://perma.cc/TN34-KY2E]. 
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and prevents further marine pollution.  Frameworks can and 
should be created with the flexibility to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  Such a procedure would increase the effectiveness 
of a regime by improving the protections in response to better, 
more accurate data and assessments.  However, none of the legal 
mechanisms described above have any avenue for amendment 
based on new scientific information.  MPAs are not redrawn after 
understanding whether their existing boundaries work; liability and 
EIA schemes are not altered with knowledge of new transboundary 
effects. 
Scientific information should inform what environmental 
assessments are appropriate, what comprehensive actions will 
effectively protect habitats, and what buffer areas are required for a 
successful MPA.  Leaving decisions to States’ discretion, without 
any scientific information or thresholds that trigger action, allows 
States to evade implementation of regulations.  Such data requires 
continued monitoring and feedback on the implementation of 
existing mechanisms.  Thus, any successful solution should 
explicitly specify the scientific processes and toolkits to be used for 
(1) taking baseline data, (2) measuring transboundary impacts, 
and (3) holistically creating MPAs.  This will allow a standardized 
approach across the Arctic.  These efforts outlined above require 
the Arctic States to communicate and to share information once 
gathered.  Beyond utility modification and learning facilitation, 
effective regimes should also provide for coordination. 
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Figure 3: Vulnerability of Seabirds, Mammals and Fish Given June Ice 
Conditions152 
C. Coordination 
Commitments and accords become “effective in changing 
behavior if they create linkages with other issues and objectives.”153  
Especially where there are collective action problems, as in most 
transboundary pollution issues, legal frameworks that enhance 
cooperation between their member States will be more effective in 
addressing the problem.  These regimes allow parties to engage in 
interactive decision making to reap joint gains or avoid joint losses.  
Coordination needs to be achieved within each convention 
(internal consistency) and between conventions (external 
consistency). 
The Arctic Council lacks both internal and external consistency.  
This is due, in part, to the fact that the Council operates through 
its siloed working groups instead of cooperative remedial action.154  
The Council’s reliance on dedicated working groups hampers the 
overcoming of the sectoral division due to its very structure.155  For 
example, CAFF and PAME should, in theory, work together to 
address pollution and the effects on wildlife.  Yet, there is little 
indication that these working groups are indeed communicating.156 
Despite the number of independent regulations governing the 
Arctic and a growing number of organizations that deal with Arctic 
matters, there is little cross-referencing and collaboration across 
groups and secretariats of treaties.157  For example, in 2012, the 
International Maritime Organization Legal Committee addressed 
the issue of establishing an international regime covering liability 
and compensation for oil pollution damage resulting from offshore 
oil exploration and exploitation.158  However, the committee 
concluded that bilateral and regional arrangements were the most 
 
152.  The Arctic Risk Map, available online at https://maps.dnvgl.com/arcticriskmap/. 
153.  VICTOR ET AL., supra note 77, at 12. 
154.  WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 54, 57.  
155.  Id. at 57. 
156.  Id. 
157.  See WEIDEMANN, supra note 8, at 119. 
158.  Jae Sundaram, Offshore Oil Pollution Damage:  In Pursuit of a Uniform International Civil 
Liability Regime, 28 DENNING L.J. 66, 94 (2016). 
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appropriate way to achieve success in this area.159  The committee 
did not specifically consider the impacts of transboundary oil 
pollution or how transboundary environmental assessments can 
help determine the sources of oil pollution. 
As outlined in Part II, the hodge-podge of treaties governing the 
Arctic is a testament to this problem.  Given the participation issues 
described above, this lack of coordination is not surprising.  
However, in light of the competing uses of the opening Arctic 
Ocean (shipping, oil and gas, fishing, etc.), there are multiple 
interactive and cumulative stressors that require a coordinated 
effort to address.  Coordination not only saves interested states the 
cost of duplicative work in environmental monitoring and 
assessment,160 it can also aid in ensuring that non-conflicting 
regulations are adopted by the different regimes working within 
the Arctic.  Any effective solution must offer some way for these 
treaties to “speak with” one another and overcome the limits of 
treaty participation. 
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
Part IV of this Note describes three ways to protect the marine 
environment by incorporating utility modification, learning 
facilitation, and coordination.  Given the gaps in governance 
previously identified, Part IV of this Note outlines new strategies for 
addressing transboundary marine pollution caused by extractive 
activities in the arctic.  First, to address utility modification, a 
regime needs to (1) improve participation, (2) provide funding, 
and (3) account for liability.  Second, a regime needs to be built on 
sound scientific information and must be flexible enough to 
accommodate changing scientific understanding.  Third, a 
successful Arctic regime must be cooperative across all working 
entities. 
 
159.  See JULIEN ROCHETTE ET AL., IDDRI, SEEING BEYOND THE HORIZON FOR DEEPWATER 
OIL AND GAS: STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF OFFSHORE EXPLORATION 
AND EXPLOITATION, 26 (2014) https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/import/ 
publications/st0114_jr-et-al._offshore-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF9P-6DFM].  
160.  A great deal of coordination can be achieved between the Arctic Council and other 
environmental organizations researching and monitoring in the Arctic.  For example, 
coordinated efforts between the International Arctic Science Committee, an observer to 
Arctic Council, and GRID-Arendal, UNEP’s official center on polar environmental 
assessments, would maximize the information base about this poorly understood 
environment. 
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In particular, this Note suggests three strategies:  first, a 
transboundary marine pollution agreement; second, a regional 
insurance standard; and finally, a coordinated and standardized 
MPA establishment program under a standardized timeline.  The 
proposed transboundary marine pollution agreement seeks to take 
the best of each country’s offshore environmental protection 
regulations and harmonize them.  This aims to address the 
questions of participation, funding, coordination, and learning.  
The proposed regional insurance standard aims to bolster the 
liability scheme in the Arctic.  Finally, the MPA program seeks to 
actively protect Arctic resources while the first two measures are 
addressed.  Since States appear to favor a regional approach over 
an international agreement, the following measures are Arctic 
specific. 
A. Long Range Transboundary Marine Pollution Regime 
(“LRTMP”) 
Some authors have suggested that Arctic coastal states should 
share information about their existing regulatory programs, their 
implementation stories, and their successes and failures.161  They 
argue that such information sharing can work incrementally toward 
convergence of the policies that best work to protect the Arctic 
marine environment.162  This process, called harmonization, works 
in a bottom-up manner.  However, as a result of the delay in 
reaching harmonization of voluntary regimes, “efforts to protect 
and manage the Arctic can suffer from a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ effect, where a lack of action by one or more states 
can undermine or hinder the effective action of others.”163  In 
particular, environmental monitoring, pollution reduction 
decommissioning, and training of operators in the Arctic requires 
standardized approaches given the transboundary nature of the oil 
pollution.164  Negotiations between Arctic Coastal states can result 
in an amalgam of successful strategies from different countries.  
 
161.  See, e.g., Betsy Baker, Offshore Oil and Gas Regulation in the Arctic: Room for 
Harmonization?, 4 Y.B. OF POLAR L. IV 475 (2012). 
162.  Id.  
163.  Tavis Potts & Clive Schofield, An Arctic Scramble?  Opportunities and Threats in the 
(Formerly) Frozen North, 23 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 151, 172 (2008). 
164.  See Baker, supra note 161, at 497. 
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However, information exchange is the first step in harmonization 
discussions.165 
The Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (“LRTAP”) 
framework provides an interesting parallel and starting point to 
understand how to create a successful regime to address 
transboundary pollution issues.  The LRTAP regime succeeded in 
reducing acid deposition through a tripartite framework:  (1) 
information exchange, (2) cross sector collaboration and 
regulation through working groups, and (3) iterative 
management.166  In 1969, OECD’s Air Management Sector Group 
concluded that “the long range transport of air pollutants in 
Europe is primarily due to the emissions from the large 
industrialized areas.”167  These Sulphur emissions were the direct 
result of higher coal burning activities throughout Europe in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries.168  This transboundary risk led to 
cooperative monitoring over the next decade.169  This information 
formed the basis of the LRTAP.170  The Sulphur air pollution 
transport mechanism found in the LRTAP is very similar to the 
transboundary oil pollution flows in the Arctic.  However, as 
discussed infra, the scientific information being compiled for the 
Arctic thus far does not monitor transboundary pollution. Arctic 
States need independent monitoring and research on the 
mechanism of ice-rafted pollution.  This monitoring and reporting 
should be the first stage in the formation of a transboundary marine 
pollution regime. 
Once such information is established, however, a LRTMP regime 
will likely face the same problems as the LRTAP regime with the 
 
165.  Id. at 498. 
166.  See Juan Carlos di Primio, Data Quality and Compliance Control in the European 
Air Pollution Regime in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 283 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).  See also, Vladimir 
Kotov & Elena Nikitina, Implementation and Effectiveness of the Acid Rain Regime in 
Russia, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMMITMENTS 519–49 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998); see also, Vladimir Kotov & Elena 
Nikitina, Regime and Enterprise:  Norilsk Nickel and Transboundary Air Pollution, in THE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 
549–75 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998). 
167.  Brynjulf Ottar, Organization of Long Range Transport of Air Pollution Monitoring 
in Europe, Norwegian Institute for Air Research, available online at 
https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/gtr/gtr_ne23/gtr_ne23_105.pdf.  
168.  Id.  
169.  Id.  
170.  Id.  
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implementation of pollution controls.  In the LRTAP, net exporters 
of transboundary sulphur pollutants had a strong internal coal 
lobby preventing effective enforcement of these rules.171  Unlike 
the LRTAP, however, the LRTMP has the benefit of being a 
relatively preemptive regime.  That is, unlike the coal burning 
practices that the LRTAP was attempting to modify, offshore oil 
drilling in the Arctic is not the dominant method and source of oil 
reserves.172  As such, countries that are likely to export oil 
pollution—e.g., Russia—will be easier to convince than those in the 
air pollution regime.173  In contrast to exporters of pollution, net 
importers of transboundary oil pollution will require less 
convincing of the importance of a regime that controls 
transboundary pollution. 
Parties to the LRTMP should add mandatory language that 
implements Articles 78 and 206 of UNCLOS.  Laws under the 
LRTMP should include mandatory practices for oil drilling (safety 
protocols, seasonal restrictions, etc.), transboundary environmental 
impact assessments, and fines and penalties for any violations.  
Importantly, such regulations should specify the scientific bases for 
the environmental assessments.  Such regulations should clarify the 
vague language under UNCLOS and specify what is meant by 
“substantial pollution,” “significant and harmful changes to the 
marine environment,” and the steps necessary to monitor and 
assess the effects as well as standardize such reporting 
requirements.174  The third and final stage of setting up the LRTMP 
is requiring a conference for amendments every two years.  
Proposals for amendments to the LRTMP regime will be based on 
new scientific information, new transboundary pollution 
assessments (e.g., if a specific Arctic current changes direction 
thereby altering the directionality of oil pollution flows), or on 
Indigenous knowledge. 
 
171.  Id. 
172.  Venezuela and Saudi Arabia have the largest oil reserves in the world, with most of 
them in oil sands.  See Jessica Dillinger, The World’s Largest Oil Reserves By Country, WORLD 
ATLAS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-world-s-largest-oil-reserves-by-
country.html [https://perma.cc/R2NV-ZMFL] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
173.  Rylin McGee, Russia’s Arctic Development: Problems and Priorities, GEOHISTORY  
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://geohistory.today/russia-arctic-development-power/ [https: 
//perma.cc/GLE8-DSAT] (Russia in particular has planned a large number of offshore 
drilling facilities.). 
174.  UNCLOS, supra note 11.  
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By requiring information exchange, the LRTMP regime 
encourages cooperation across all the Arctic entities and working 
groups.  Indeed, the regime should run all information exchanged 
through the Arctic Council with Indigenous representation.  The 
Council already has existing working groups which provide a useful 
starting point for the information exchange.  Requiring party 
countries and indigenous communities to add to this repository will 
create a more complete understanding of transboundary oil 
pollution effects.  The LRTMP regime also encourages 
participation by harmonizing the offshore drilling policies of all 
Arctic littoral States.  Finally, by requiring continuous monitoring 
and iterative amendments, the regime also facilitates active 
learning of the marine environment. 
B. Role of Insurance and Re-insurance Requirements 
While the aforementioned LRTMP regime solves the 
coordination, participation, and learning facilitation parts of the 
Oran Young assessment from Section II, it does not satisfactorily 
address liability.  Article 232 of UNCLOS requires States to be 
liable for damage or loss attributable to them.175  The Greenlandic 
Prime Minister proposed the establishment of an industry-backed 
fund to ensure adequate compensation for damage caused by 
offshore hydrocarbon activities in the Arctic, but such an 
agreement has not found its place in any existing legal regime.176  
As such, any solution should incorporate a mechanism to achieve 
the required compensation levels and require extractive companies 
to take preventive action.  This Section of the Note proposes that 
such a solution is to have a regional insurance treaty drafted and 
incorporated by insurance companies. 
Even if a penalty scheme is established within LRTMP as outlined 
above, it suffers from one large weakness: the damages are assessed 
only after the environmental damage has occurred.  It is entirely 
possible that, given the limited ecological understanding of the 
effects of oil pollution in the Arctic, actual damages from spills of 
extensive pollution will cost more to remediate than initially 
estimated.  Most insurance companies “have deemed the Arctic too 
risky a market to cover, meaning that self-insurance and adequate 
 
175.  Id. at art. 232 
176.  JOHNSTONE, supra note 33, at 260. 
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contingency funds are of great importance  in forming a credible 
risk management strategy.”177 If the damages exceed the insurance 
coverage, the loss will inure to the environment—especially if there 
are environmental damages to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.178  Indeed, “[s]elf-insurance has been deemed far too 
low and insufficient to cover such financial liabilities” as could 
occur in the Arctic environment.179 
Currently, there are no regional insurance agreements governing 
the offshore hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic.180  Proposals for 
group insurance schemes to be shared across Arctic States have 
received a tepid response at best.181  Nevertheless, insurance 
companies have begun to realize the risks associated with Arctic 
drilling activity and the need for financial security.182  Lloyd’s of 
London, one of the world’s biggest insurer, recommends more 
investment in science and research to “close knowledge gaps, 
reduce uncertainties and manage risks.”183  Additionally, Lloyd’s of 
London also “calls for sizeable investment in infrastructure and 
surveillance to enable ‘safe economic activity’ and argues that ‘full-
scale exercises based on worst-case scenarios of environmental 
disaster should be run by companies.’”184 
The “polluter pays principle” and the “precautionary approach” 
have been cursorily identified by PAME in its Arctic Oil and Gas 
Guidelines for industry but have not been adopted in any binding 
legal obligations.185  These approaches should support a new 
regional treaty that governs the insurance industry.  “A 
precautionary approach does not . . . require a complete 
 
177.  LÁRA JÓHANNSDÓTTIR & DAVID COOK, INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS: CTR. FOR ARCTIC 
POLICY STUDIES, AN INSURANCE PERSPECTIVE ON ARCTIC OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS: 
HYDROCARBON EXPLORATION AND SHIPPING 20 (2014). 
178.  JOHNSTONE, supra note 33, at 261. 
179.  JÓHANNSDÓTTIR & COOK, supra note 177, at 17. 
180.  JOHNSTONE, supra note 33, at 265. 
181.  Id. at 265–66. 
182.  CHARLES EMMERSON & GLADE LAHN, CHATHAM HOUSE, ARCTIC OPENING: 
OPPORTUNITY AND RISK IN THE HIGH NORTH (2012). 
183.  Insurance Giant Lloyd’s of London Warns Of ‘Unique and Hard-To-Manage Risk’ Of Arctic 
Ocean Oil Drilling, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2012), https://thinkprogress.org/insurance-
giant-lloyds-of-london-warns-of-unique-and-hard-to-manage-risk-of-arctic-ocean-oil-
279c22a2a206/ [https://perma.cc/7UNF-XUK2]. 
184.  Julia Kollewe & Terry Macalister, Arctic Oil Rush Will Ruin Ecosystem, Warns Lloyd’s of 
London, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2012/apr/12/lloyds-london-warns-risks-arctic-oil-drilling [https://perma.cc/K53N-VKQC]. 
185.  See JOHNSTONE, supra note 33, at 152. 
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prohibition of activity in the absence of certainty, but it does 
require strong measures to mitigate the risk.”186 If such a treaty 
were to be adopted by states, it would require insurance companies 
within their jurisdictions to have insurance packages tailored to the 
environmental sensitivity of the Arctic.  In particular, oil companies 
intending to explore hydrocarbon resources would have to 
demonstrate response capacity and adopt specific technology, 
emergency plans, monitoring systems, and other environmentally 
stringent criteria in order to obtain any insurance covering their 
activities.  Indeed, risk-based drilling insurance premiums create 
incentives for firms to adopt a stronger safety culture in an effort to 
reduce the premiums they pay.187  Indeed some have argued that 
“different national systems may lead to ambiguities and 
unnecessary delays in oil pollution responses and compensation 
payments.”188  Thus, a regional treaty would ensure that 
precautions taken by operators are standardized and limit pollution 
to the marine environment in the same way. 
The regional insurance agreement will require insurance 
companies to perform their own due diligence and monitoring on 
the companies that they choose to insure.  Such monitoring could 
yield actionable information, including whether firms are adopting 
the socially optimal level of safety culture, and ensure that 
protective measures are not weakened by lack of incidents.189  The 
public release of such reports could also ensure that investors 
pressure companies to adopt more stringent measures to prevent 
incidents in the Arctic.190 
Such requirements and regional agreements may not work 
effectively without the cooperation of the insurance industry.  First, 
“the cost of monitoring could be too high for both insurance 
companies and drilling companies to remain profitable.”191  Energy 
insurers and reinsurers have the capacity to raise the required 
 
186.  Id. at 133. 
187.  Mark A. Cohen et al., Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm 
Organization and Safety, 64 Vᴀɴᴅ. L.R. 1853, 1857–58 (2011). 
188.  CHARLES EMMERSON & GLADA LAHN, CHATHAM HOUSE, ARCTIC OPENING: 
OPPORTUNITY AND RISK IN THE HIGH NORTH 40 (2012), https://www.chathamhouse. 
org/publications/papers/view/182839 [https://perma.cc/S54H-9REL]. 
189.  Cohen et al., supra note 187, at 1896. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. at 1900. 
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coverage for a spill in the Arctic.192  Indeed, coverages were raised 
and new insurance packages were created in response to the 
passage of the Oil Pollution Act and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“the 
Superfund Act”).193 
Beyond a regional insurance agreement, the Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation (“OPRC”), 
described in Part I.D.4 of this Note, could be amended to include a 
financial responsibility clause stating: to engage in activities that 
expose outside parties to risks, a firm must demonstrate that it has 
sufficient resources—either its own (self-insurance) or third-party 
insurance coverage—to compensate injured parties in the event of 
an accident.194  While domestic laws, such as the Oil Pollution Act 
in the United States, have such a requirement, none of the 
international agreements referenced in this paper have such 
requirements.195  Such a scheme would be readily implemented 
through OPRC.  The coverage should include costs of cleanup and 
any permanent damages to the ecosystems. 
Such an insurance agreement would work well with the Offshore 
Pollution Liability Agreement (“OPOL”), “an agreement between 
thirteen major oil companies designed to provide compensation to 
victims of oil pollution damage arising from an offshore oil well 
blowout.”196  Given the language of OPOL it is not clear that it is 
applicable to environmental damages.197  Furthermore, OPOL is an 
entirely voluntary agreement with a limited liability scheme capped 
 
192.  Id. at 1901 (“Robert Hartwig of the Insurance Information Institute testified on 
June 9, 2010, that it would be impossible for energy insurers or reinsurers to raise $10 billion 
of coverage.  He cited several reasons, including the difficulty of underwriting for unlikely, 
but extremely severe events that are difficult to predict.”).  
193.  See James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and 
Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?, 34–38 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 01-
42, 2011).  
194.  See Tamara L. Lev, Liability for Environmental Damages from the Offshore Petroleum 
Industry: Strict Liability Justifications and the Judgment Proof Problem, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 483, 490–
93 (2017).  
195.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (2019); see supra note 54. 
196.  Sue Vern Tan, License to Spill?  Developing a Framework for International Liability and 
Compensation for Transboundary Pollution Arising from Offshore Drilling Activities, 40 (2015) 
(emphasis added) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Toronto) (on file with author); 
see also William N. Hancock & Robert M. Stone, Liability for Transnational Pollution Caused by 
Offshore Oil Rig Blowout, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 377, 393–94 (1982). 
197.  Vern Tan, supra note 196, at 41. 
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at US$250 million per incident.198  As discussed above, there is a 
significant chance of spills in the Arctic whose cleanup costs would 
exceed $250 million.199  A regional insurance agreement would not 
only complement the financial coverage but could also encourage 
greater participation in OPOL. 
The regional insurance agreement therefore furthers the efficacy 
of the established LRTMP regime by ensuring there is a successful 
liability scheme.  Liability created by these insurance agreements 
acts as a deterrent and is truly compensatory because it requires 
market actors to internalize the risks associated with offshore oil 
drilling. 
C. Marine Protected Area Planning 
Harmonizing laws of Arctic States, gathering transboundary oil 
pollution data, and establishing regional insurance agreements 
requires time.  While these policies are being negotiated and 
implemented, offshore oil drilling efforts may continue along with 
its intendant risks to the Arctic.  Thus, it is of paramount 
importance that the Arctic States immediately coordinate with one 
another to establish Marine Protected Areas (“MPAs”) that will 
protect critical habitats in the Arctic.  Under the CBD, a network of 
protected areas is of particular importance for the conservation of 
marine biodiversity.200  In response to climate change, marine 
species migrate more than terrestrial species.201  As such, a network 
of fully connected MPAs is needed to guarantee effective 
protection.202 
While OSPAR and the Arctic Council have encouraged States to 
use their discretion to establish MPAs in their sovereign areas, 
there are no clear timelines and standards for doing so.  
Importantly, given the background of transboundary pollution, it is 
 
198.  Id. at 41. 
199.  See Rochette, supra note 159, at 24; The Offshore Pollution Liab. Ass’n, Offshore 
Pollution Liability Agreement, cl. 4(a) (Apr. 1, 2015) http://www.opol.org.uk/ 
downloads/OPOL-Agreement-From-1april2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/R67L-UA2Q]. 
200.  Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Technical Advice on the 
Establishment and Management of a National System of Marine and Coastal Protected Areas, at 14, 
20–21, CBD Technical Series No. 13 (2004), https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ65-KMEC]. 
201.  See Nick Bradford, Marine Species on the Move, NAT’L ENVTL. EDUC. FUND (2018), 
https://www.neefusa.org/weather-and-climate/marine-species-move 
[https://perma.cc/5AGM-XVMC]. 
202.  JAKOBSEN, supra note 138, at 156; see also supra note 138.  
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not clear how activities of littoral states will affect the MPAs of other 
states or what scientific buffer zones should be established.  The 
Council can and should propose guidelines for a standardized 
approach for marine protected areas including but not limited to 
buffer zones, coordination with and reports to other Arctic States, 
and specific timelines for establishing these MPAs.  This is entirely 
in keeping with the Council’s Strategic Plan that sets out a pan-
Arctic network of MPAs as an important objective.203  “However, no 
current plan exists to develop a marine spatial plan for the entire 
Arctic region.”204  None of the current frameworks consider the 
cumulative impacts of multiple drilling operations.205  The 
designation of wildlife refuges and marine protected areas, 
shipping routes, and decisions to drill in coastal areas should all 
consider these transboundary impacts.206  Transboundary oil 
pollution will determine the ultimate efficacy of such protected 
areas.207  Importantly, where there are multiple stressors and 
transboundary effects from fishing, shipping, and hydrocarbon 
extraction, MPAs and their associated buffer zones should consider 
the cumulative impacts of different operations in the arctic. 
The creation of a standardized approach should also include 
indigenous knowledge.  As outlined above in Part III, indigenous 
communities around the Arctic have a depth of knowledge about 
critical and endangered habitats.208  They can also qualify the 
designation of MPAs based on indigenous needs and values.  “A 
 
203.  JAKOBSEN, supra note 138, at 128; see also PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T, 
ARCTIC MARINE STRATEGIC PLAN 2015-2025 (2015), https://www.pame.is/images/ 
03_Projects/AMSP/AMSP_2015-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WPU-F95N]. 
204.  PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T, PAME WORK PLAN 2017–2019 (2017), 
https://pame.is/images/01_PAME/Work_Plan/PAME_Work_Plan_2017-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8L4Q-KAQE]; see also CHARLES N. EHLER, THE ASPEN INST., PART TWO: 
MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING IN THE ARCTIC 78 (2017), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/ee/Aspen_MSP_Rep
ort_II.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQK5-VP4M]. 
205.  Elizabeth A. Kirk & Raeanne G. Miller, Offshore Oil & Gas Installations in the 
Arctic: Responding to Uncertainty through Science and Law, THE ARCTIC Y.B. at 9 (The 
Arctic EIA guidelines suggest that cumulative impacts to be taken into account, but these 
guidelines are only voluntary). 
206.  See Columbia University, As Climate Stirs Arctic Sea Ice Faster, Pollution Tags Along, 
PHYS.ORG (June 27, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-06-climate-arctic-sea-ice-
faster.html#jCp [https://perma.cc/5EPN-K7V7]. 
207.  Id. 
208.  LISA SPEER & THOMAS L. LAUGHLIN, IUCN/NRDC WORKSHOP TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF 
ECOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OR VULNERABILITY IN THE ARCTIC MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT 15 (2010). 
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systematic effort to gather and incorporate that knowledge would 
contribute significantly to this exercise and others.”209 
Priority should be given to ecologically critical and sensitive 
areas—such as the “Last Ice Area,” located north of Greenland and 
Canada’s Ellesmere Island.210  This area harbors the largest 
concentration of Arctic wildlife dependent on arctic ice for survival, 
including bowhead whales, seals, narwhals, and polar bears.211  The 
ice sheet is the thickest there, and given its thickness, is not likely to 
be exploited in the foreseeable future.212  As such, it would be 
easier to implement international agreements towards designating 
this region as a protected area.  The multilateral treaty focusing on 
the development of the marine protected area should also 
highlight mechanisms for its protection against oil pollution, 
including adaptive buffer areas. 
The Council should also determine what, if any, areas should be 
protected in the ABNJ.  However, the current international legal 
framework does not assign a clear mandate to specific 
organizations for designating holistic MPAs.  It may be necessary to 
create an authority, similar to the International Seabed Authority, 
that has the capacity to create and govern Areas of Particular 
Environmental Interest in the seafloor of ABNJ.213  Yet, such an 
organization would have to be contained within the auspices of 
UNCLOS, to which the U.S. is not a party.214  The protection of 
critical habitats in the ABNJ from transboundary marine pollution 
will therefore remain open until U.S. participation is clarified or, 
indeed, ratified.  Alternatively, instead of the creation of a new 
authority under UNCLOS, Arctic States could, by agreement, give 
the Arctic Council the power to create binding MPA regulations 
 
209.  Id. 
210.  The Last Ice Area, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/ 
projects/pristine-seas/expeditions/the-last-ice-area/ [https://perma.cc/7EFX-5BBY] (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2019). 
211.  Id. 
212.  Tim Folger, Here’s Where the Arctic’s Wildlife Will Make Its Lase Stand, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/01/arctic-
wildlife-sea-ice/ [https://perma.cc/6QAC-F57Y].  The thickness of the Arctic ice sheet 
makes drilling currently impracticable. 
213.  See About the International Seabed Authority, INT’L SEABED AUTHORITY, 
https://www.isa.org.jm/authority [https://perma.cc/KJW4-VHQF] (last visited Sept. 26, 
2019).  
214.  See supra, Table 1.  
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and the power to enforce the timely creation of standardized 
MPAs. 
Since research indicates that ice-rafted pollution will move faster 
when there is less ice, there is also a need for more stringent buffer 
zones.215  Research should be coordinated across the different 
regimes operational in the Arctic, and across various stakeholders.  
As outlined in the previous sections, research and maps created by 
independent third parties will be especially valuable in offering an 
apolitical basis for the designation of MPAs.  Coordination between 
CAFF and PAME would also provide better cross-disciplinary 
research to understand the impact of marine pollution on 
biodiversity in the region. 
V. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES  
The Arctic matters for the U.S.  The Alaskan Arctic represents 
“the fourth coast of the United States.”216  However, the governing 
document for this region remains UNCLOS, to which the U.S. is 
not a party.217  Thus, while Russia has aggressively staked its 
territory in the Arctic for resource extraction, the U.S. has 
remained powerless to deny Russia’s Arctic expansion efforts 
because it cannot serve on the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf.218  Further, it remains unclear whether the U.S. 
can claim additional continental shelf territory for resource 
extraction as a non-party.219  In the past, the U.S. has recognized 
the mismatch between the growing importance of the Arctic and 
the lack of American resources to adequately protect the region or 
its resources.220  As of February 2019, Congress released an updated 
report on “Changes in the Arctic Environment” re-iterating the 
importance of the region and how oil and gas activities could affect 
 
215.  See Newton et al., supra note 39. 
216.  Jonathan Masters, The Arctic Is Integral to U.S. National Security, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/interview/arctic-integral-us-national-
security [https://perma.cc/5B72-D4UF]. 
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218.  See Paraskova, supra note 6; see also McGee, supra note 173. 
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(2008) (“The United States may also be able to make an extended continental shelf claim in 
the Arctic region, perhaps claiming more than 200,000 square miles of additional undersea 
territories.  Its ability to make such a claim credibly will be substantially weakened if it 
remains outside the Law of the Sea Convention.”). 
220.  Todd L. Sharp, The Implications of Ice Melt on Arctic Security, 11 DEF. STUD. 297, 307 
(2011). 
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the environment.221  Concerns about the environmental impacts of 
offshore extractive activities have led to leasing bans enacted by 
Congress and the President in certain areas of the Arctic Ocean of 
special ecological significance.222  However, because the U.S. is not 
a party to treaties that manage transboundary pollution,223 it is 
exposed to environmental degradation in its Arctic territory caused 
by another state’s extractive efforts and the Trump administration 
does not seem to be concerned with environmental protections in 
the Arctic or otherwise.224  As such, even if the U.S. chooses not to 
ratify UNCLOS, it should take a leadership role in any Arctic 
regimes and solutions that are proposed. Binding itself to an 
international Arctic Treaty would “signal to all Arctic and maritime 
stakeholders that the U.S. is not simply a hegemonic state that 
abides by only its own rules, but a member of the global community 
that values and upholds international law.”225 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current legal frameworks from UNCLOS to OPRC do not 
effectively protect the Arctic environment from transboundary 
pollution resulting from extractive activities.  Existing international 
agreements fail for three reasons: they fail to modify state actors’ 
utilities, they fail to facilitate learning and are inflexible, and they 
fail in facilitating coordination. 
This Note recommends three specific solutions.  First, a binding 
agreement that focuses on long range transboundary marine 
pollution, which would harmonize approaches of all Arctic states 
and improve our understanding of the Arctic marine environment 
through research, data gathering and monitoring.  Second, this 
Note proposes a mechanism by which private actors can be 
integrated into policies protecting the Arctic environment.  The 
solution requires a regional insurance treaty drafted and 
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incorporated by insurance companies which would force 
companies undertaking extractive activities to internalize the costs 
of pollution.  Finally, this Note proposes a scheme of conservation 
through marine protected areas with flexible buffer zones. 
“Hydrocarbon development in the marine Arctic is already a 
reality.”226  There is a tendency for the law to be reactive rather 
than proactive, and this tendency ought to be corrected.  As one 
key insurance agent commented in response to disasters, 
“[r]egulations rushed into force do not address underlying causes 
but public outrage, often generated by shocking images: . . . a 
soiled beach, an oil-covered seabird.”227  Collective action cannot 
wait for one of the last few pristine environments on this planet to 
be irreversibly contaminated.  States have an obligation to prevent 
transboundary harm and to protect marine biodiversity.  The last 
remaining sea ice has somewhat deterred extractive activity.  States 
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